Agentic Skill security (AST10)
Kiyo maps the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 to its own controls in agent-security/owasp-ast10.md.
Mapping
Section titled “Mapping”| AST risk | What the Kiyo assessment asks for | Kiyo controls | Owners |
|---|---|---|---|
| AST01 Malicious Skills | Compare purpose, instructions, and harmful requested effects | KIYO-SEC-001, KIYO-SEC-003 |
Kiyo, developer release, human org, host |
| AST02 Supply Chain Compromise | Establish source and publisher provenance, and changes | KIYO-SEC-004, KIYO-DEP-001 |
Release, Kiyo, human |
| AST03 Over-Privileged Skills | Compare access and effects with actual task need | KIYO-PERM-001, KIYO-SEC-006 |
Kiyo, host, human |
| AST04 Insecure Metadata | Compare honest metadata with the supported schema and actual payload | KIYO-SEC-002 |
Release, host, Kiyo |
| AST05 Untrusted External Instructions | Treat README, issues, web, tool output, Memory, and copied approvals as untrusted | KIYO-SEC-003, KIYO-TRUST-001 |
Kiyo, host, human |
| AST06 Weak Isolation | Establish required host controls or hold dependent execution | KIYO-SEC-006 |
Host, human, Kiyo |
| AST07 Update Drift | Review version, content, and permission changes before adopting an update | KIYO-SEC-005, KIYO-AUTH-004 |
Release, human, host, Kiyo |
| AST08 Poor Scanning | Separate static inspection, behavioral evaluation, and their gaps | KIYO-SEC-007 |
Release, Kiyo, host |
| AST09 No Governance | Identify the actual owner, approval, inventory, and revocation process | KIYO-SEC-008, KIYO-AUTH-004 |
Human, Kiyo, host |
| AST10 Cross-Platform Reuse | Check each host’s controls and unsupported gaps independently | KIYO-SEC-009, KIYO-SEC-002 |
Release, host, Kiyo, human |
Key controls
Section titled “Key controls”| Control | Rule |
|---|---|
KIYO-SEC-001 Establish trust from evidence |
Trust comes from evidence, not popularity, a logo, a marketplace listing, or the word “official”. Unsigned is not the same as malicious; Kiyo does not invent a universal unsigned-Skill ban |
KIYO-SEC-002 Honest metadata versus payload |
Canonical metadata is name and description; platform fields belong in overlays. Metadata is inspected as data, and containment, traversal, and symlinks are checked |
KIYO-SEC-004 Bind review to the actual artifact |
A hash computed from a candidate proves neither its origin nor that it matches a trusted artifact |
KIYO-SEC-005 Reassess changed content before reuse |
No watcher or background rescanning. The same version text with changed bytes is an integrity discrepancy |
KIYO-SEC-007 Keep review layers explicit |
Four layers (static, behavioral, adversarial behavioral, live target) never upgrade each other; “no finding” never becomes proof of safety |
KIYO-SEC-008 Accountable optional records |
Inventory, approval, revocation, and incident templates; a revocation document is not a kill switch |
KIYO-SEC-009 Verify each platform independently |
Six-target parity is tracked separately; one host’s result is never another’s evidence |
Cross-platform control status
Section titled “Cross-platform control status”The framework’s six-target control matrix, a review baseline recorded 2026-09-29 in control-ownership.md, marks every control on every host as U/T: native control capability UNKNOWN for this assessment, and live NOT_TESTED. The Codex IDE extension is marked I/T: the same result, plus the earlier documentation-only finding that its native-plugin route is UNSUPPORTED (NOT_REVALIDATED in that step). No live control trial has been run on any host.
Review procedure
Section titled “Review procedure”The shared Skill Audit (trust-review.md) is a seven-step procedure. It is not a ninth Skill or an installer, and it defaults to G1 Observe. Use it through the Security Skill’s skills submode. The walkthrough is Audit a third-party Skill.